The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War

The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War

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  • Create Date:2022-09-23 09:51:48
  • Update Date:2025-09-06
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  • Author:Nicholas Mulder
  • ISBN:0300270488
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Summary

The first international history of the emergence of economic sanctions during the interwar period and the legacy of this development

“Valuable 。 。 。 offers many lessons for Western policy makers today。”—Paul Kennedy, Wall Street Journal

"The lessons are sobering。”—The Economist


“Original and persuasive。 。 。 。 For those who see economic sanctions as a relatively mild way of expressing displeasure at a country’s behavior, this book 。 。 。 will come as something of a revelation。”—Lawrence D。 Freedman, Foreign Affairs

Economic sanctions dominate the landscape of world politics today。 First developed in the early twentieth century as a way of exploiting the flows of globalization to defend liberal internationalism, their appeal is that they function as an alternative to war。 This view, however, ignores the dark paradox at their core: designed to prevent war, economic sanctions are modeled on devastating techniques of warfare。

Tracing the use of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder uses extensive archival research in a political, economic, legal, and military history that reveals how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations。 This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous。

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Reviews

Ziikii

lettura fondamentale

Kate Richardson

2。5 stars。 I was excited to read this because of the current talk around Russian sanctions, but since this book ends after WWII it's not all that helpful in understanding modern use of sanctions。 There's some interesting stuff in here, but I had a hard time seeing the thread that tied it all together。 2。5 stars。 I was excited to read this because of the current talk around Russian sanctions, but since this book ends after WWII it's not all that helpful in understanding modern use of sanctions。 There's some interesting stuff in here, but I had a hard time seeing the thread that tied it all together。 。。。more

Steven

Solid, if denseThis book was good, not excellent。 Very dense at times (though that will be of interest to the true history buffs)。 I preferred to skim and read the toplines, though the conclusions were in fact noteworthy and salient for the future of sanctions policy making。

Brian Vargo

meh, a history, not much to relate to current events vis-a-vis e。g。, sanctions on Russia。

Dave

Sanctions are a favorite instrument of the American Empire and as such it is valuable to investigate their history and scrutinize their efficacy。 Mulder traces the history of economic sanctions (in their contemporary incarnation) to those directed against the Central Powers in the First World War, when the war time leaders conceived of sanctions as "the economic weapon", a means to inflict damage against the enemy without shells or mortars。 As Mulder demonstrates, it is fairly difficult to gauge Sanctions are a favorite instrument of the American Empire and as such it is valuable to investigate their history and scrutinize their efficacy。 Mulder traces the history of economic sanctions (in their contemporary incarnation) to those directed against the Central Powers in the First World War, when the war time leaders conceived of sanctions as "the economic weapon", a means to inflict damage against the enemy without shells or mortars。 As Mulder demonstrates, it is fairly difficult to gauge the effectiveness of sanctions, though he demonstrates that it is very unlikely that sanctions have worked as intended more in more than two or three limited examples, confined to now forgotten international disputes in the interwar period。 Mulder traces the intellectual history of sanctions, which were simultaneously understood as a weapon with which to coerce enemies into desired by outcomes, but also by the day's liberal internationalist thinkers as a potential 'non-violent' tool in the arsenal of diplomacy。 Mulder demonstrates that sanctions have largely remained ineffective and have in fact often induced 'bad' behavior from authoritarian militarist states who are induced ultimately to double down on illegal foreign interventions and focus on autarkic internal industrialization, state behaviors which, to this day, sanctions are deployed to try to prevent。 。。。more

Krishna Kalpathy

Good, efficient history of economic sanctions。 Essential reading for policymakers and concerned citizens alike。 One of those instances where knowing the history can significantly change your perspective on something we take for granted in contemporary politics。 I had already been aware of ethical concerns regarding sanctions, but the history is useful。 Prompted lots of ethical and strategic thinking for me。

Ben Boehlert

Excellent book, although I wish many of the themes explained in the conclusion were teased out more in the rest of the book

Robert Wechsler

An excellent history of blockades and economic sanctions starting in the nineteenth century, but with a focus on the interwar period。 Without taking a contemporary perspective, it provides a lot of background for today’s many sanctions that have allowed the U。S。 to try to manipulate governments and bring harm to people all over the world without declaring war。 It’s notable how little sanctions are questioned in the U。S。 today and how much they were questioned in the past。 In fact, after WWI the An excellent history of blockades and economic sanctions starting in the nineteenth century, but with a focus on the interwar period。 Without taking a contemporary perspective, it provides a lot of background for today’s many sanctions that have allowed the U。S。 to try to manipulate governments and bring harm to people all over the world without declaring war。 It’s notable how little sanctions are questioned in the U。S。 today and how much they were questioned in the past。 In fact, after WWI the U。S。 was the leading country opposed to economic sanctions。 Some groups, on both the left and the right, changed their views of sanctions over time depending on the circumstances。 Sanctions have been attacked for being ineffective, ineffectual, and overly harmful。 They have also been treated as a war weapon, as an alternative to war, and as a way to prevent war (including by the threat of sanctions)。It is rare that there is any attempt to enumerate the harm that sanctions cause, directly and indirectly。 Of course, it is even harder to enumerate the harm from a failure to sanction, from the use of the wrong sanctions, or from the ineffective use of sanctions。 In other words, it’s much more complicated than you would guess from the U。S。 government or news media。Of course, there’s too much information in this book, at least for my purposes, but for the most part it’s easy to skim past the TMI sections。 Mulder’s writing is clear and well-organized。 。。。more

Jonathan

4/10“The policy debate about sanctions has been repeated almost every decade since the [League of Nations] was created in the wake of World War I。 At its core has been the perennial question: do economic sanctions work? While the success rate differs depending on the objective, the historical record is relatively clear: most economic sanctions have not worked。 In the twentieth century, only one in three uses of sanctions was “at least partially successful。” More modest goals have better chances 4/10“The policy debate about sanctions has been repeated almost every decade since the [League of Nations] was created in the wake of World War I。 At its core has been the perennial question: do economic sanctions work? While the success rate differs depending on the objective, the historical record is relatively clear: most economic sanctions have not worked。 In the twentieth century, only one in three uses of sanctions was “at least partially successful。” More modest goals have better chances of success。 But from the available data it is clear that the history of sanctions is largely a history of disappointment。" - There, now you've read the book。 I read this in June and forgot to review, that by itself says something about this book。 It wasn't bad, just obvious。 It talks about sanctions, and without ever stating it, says that soft power is not as effective as hard, and we may need to rethink the overzealous use of sanctions by countries pursuing non-military goals。 I wish this book had been written now, as most of it seems out of date mere months after its publishing due to the war in Ukraine。 Sanctions have clearly not been effective at ending the war yet, only time will tell if they have been effective at all。 He spends more time on the history of the use of sanctions than anything else, and I guess that's fine, but most seems not very applicable。 "The economic weapon may be a form of politics by other means。 But ultimately, stitching animosity into the fabric of international affairs and human exchange is of limited use in changing the world"。 。。。more

Steffi

I feel like Nicholas Mulder's book 'The Economic Weapon。 The Rise of Sanctions as Tool of Modern War' (Yale University Press, 2022) is the definite account of the 20th century history of sanctions and economic warfare。 Not that I have read particularly widely on the subject but it felt comprehensive :-) The book came out in February or March this year which is obviously too timely。 It took me nearly two months to get through this dense work as I was too busy enjoying yet another endless Damascen I feel like Nicholas Mulder's book 'The Economic Weapon。 The Rise of Sanctions as Tool of Modern War' (Yale University Press, 2022) is the definite account of the 20th century history of sanctions and economic warfare。 Not that I have read particularly widely on the subject but it felt comprehensive :-) The book came out in February or March this year which is obviously too timely。 It took me nearly two months to get through this dense work as I was too busy enjoying yet another endless Damascene summer so I have probably forgotten some things by now。Personal side note: Without going into too much detail (。。。), I believe I started to really understand what sanctions - the slow economic suffocating - can do to a country and its people。 I know, I know there are always many factors at play and it's difficult to attribute causality (when there is also corruption, war, and other crises) but, at the end of the day, sanctions remain a brutal tool of warfare against civilians, especially the economically most marginalized。 I also know the argument of 'targeted sanctions' , it's a bit like with those famous 'precision airstrikes'。 Sometimes I feel people in the west understand so little about war and poverty that they'll support any horror draped in technocratic language (think also: defensive weapons, structural adjustment, the list is really endless)。 Anyway, given that I have never really engaged with the history of sanctions, I had so many epiphanies while reading and brought up the book at pretty much every single conversation over the past two months and promised to lend the book to at least a dozen people :)Anyway, below are a few take-aways:#1 - Some statistics that surprised me: In WW I, 300,000- 400,000 people died of blockade (against the Central Powers) induced starvation and illness in Central Europe, with an additional 500,000 deaths in the Ottoman provinces of the middle east affected by the Anglo-French blockade。 Before WW II, these hundreds of thousands of deaths by economic isolation were the chief man-made cause of civilian deaths in 20th century conflict。#2 - What didn’t surprise me at all is the colonial origin of sanctions and that the newly introduced (1919) League of Nations Sanctions were considered suitable for use mainly against peripheral European states and 'semi-civilize countries'。 "Justifying the infliction of pain from a distance came easily to European elites accustomed to managing colonial empires overseas and defending class rule at home"。 Just as modern drone warfare, sanctions are primarily a means to punish unfriendly regimes (aka its people) and/or aggressors in far-away places at minimal human cost to the punishing power。#3 - Initially, sanctions, as a legitimate tool of international law (first through the League of Nations, then after WWII the UN), were developed to defend liberal internationalism and hoped to prevent war through deterrence (as a peacekeeping tool of sorts)。 As we can see from the relative nonsuccess of sanctions, this would presuppose states as 'rational actors'; i。e。 forgoing war and territorial conquest given the costs associated with sanctions that would be imposed as a result of aggression。 Quite the contrary, Mulder shows or suggest how sanctions may have actually backfired in the run-up to WW II。 Specifically, the book shows how sanctions against Mussolini’s Italy in the wake of its invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler’s Germany during its accelerating territorial conquests on the European continent may have actually fueled aggressive territorial expansion and autarky rather than curtail it。 Think of Nazi Germany's defensive autarky aimed to develop blockade resistance ("Blockadefestigkeit") through increased domestic resource production, solidification of relations with Central and East European countries, and expansions into resource-rich territory including support for Franco’s Spanish Nationalists in 1936, as well as the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939。 I found this to be the most interesting chapter, actually,#4 - Sanctions have then evolved from their original external purpose of halting inter-state war and preserving territorial order to the modern-day unilateral and multilateral tools to pursue internal goals (democratization, human rights you name it) - also designed and 'fine-tuned' by a cadre of technocrats and experts and often without consideration of their unintended consequences to civilians, and of course these days primarily driven by the financial system given that the west no longer holds a monopoly on resources but does so over the USD and Wallstreet and City of London。 Etc。 Actually, it's not true that the impact on civilians is an unintended effect overlooked by the generals are their desks in D。C。 or elsewhere: the explicit hope of sanctions is that they would eventually immiserate people to a point where they will rise up against their dictators。 The cruelty of this logic is beyond imagination。#5 - Interestingly, with the end of the cold war, sanctions use doubled in the 1990s and 2000s compared to the period 1950-1985 and by the 2010s doubled again。 According to the book (citing the UN), in 2015, 1/3 of the world's population lives in countries that are under some form of economic sanctions! While their use is expanding to deal with all sorts of adversaries and regimes, there is very little evidence of sanctions' effectiveness (the book offers an estate of '20 per cent' success but I have no idea how that would have been quantified) and most likely even less so in the 21st century。 From the beginning, one of the problems associated with economic isolation was that of neutral states and the current new cold war shows that it is pretty much impossible to effectively isolate any of the west's great rivals, good luck trying that with China next。 In this context, I also found it interesting how 'aid' or 'positive sanctions' was always part of sanctions, i。e。, providing material aid to countries who did not support adversaries, etc。, the whole while link between sanctions and humanitarianism is very illuminating。#6 - I think the last sentence of the book sums it up quite accurately "The economic weapon may be a form of politics by other means。 But ultimately, stitching animosity into the fabric of international affairs and human exchange is of limited use in changing the world"。 。。。more

Ian Partridge

This is a fascinating, compelling and very well researched book。 The subject material is dry, but the author brings the material to life through the principal actors responsible for the development of the rationale and implementation of sanctions。 The book provided me with a much improved understanding of the evolution and rationale behind sanctions。 The author, through detailed examination of events is able to bring a great deal of insight on some aspects if early 29th century conflicts and the This is a fascinating, compelling and very well researched book。 The subject material is dry, but the author brings the material to life through the principal actors responsible for the development of the rationale and implementation of sanctions。 The book provided me with a much improved understanding of the evolution and rationale behind sanctions。 The author, through detailed examination of events is able to bring a great deal of insight on some aspects if early 29th century conflicts and their resolution。 Fascinating read。 。。。more

Andrew Hanson

Recommend this read for context into the function of sanctions also relevant for sanctions dynamics for the Russia/Ukraine war today。

arkadi cloud

https://blog。arkadi。one/p/the-economi。。。 https://blog。arkadi。one/p/the-economi。。。 。。。more

Casey

A good book, providing a detailed history on the creation of economic sanctions in the early 20th century。 The author, historian Nicholas Mulder, explains the economic, legal, and political processes that combined in the wake of World War I to create the interwar sanctions regime of the League of Nations。 The scale and complexity of cutting off select continental powers from global trade in WWI required a much broader effort than a simple maritime trade blockade。 This need created the first sanc A good book, providing a detailed history on the creation of economic sanctions in the early 20th century。 The author, historian Nicholas Mulder, explains the economic, legal, and political processes that combined in the wake of World War I to create the interwar sanctions regime of the League of Nations。 The scale and complexity of cutting off select continental powers from global trade in WWI required a much broader effort than a simple maritime trade blockade。 This need created the first sanctions apparatus, teaming intelligence analyses with financial and legal efforts to suspend or restrict actions of firms。 After the war, the League of Nations took this apparatus as its primary tool to enforce global peace。 Mulder goes into great depth on the use of sanctions in the interwar period, documenting how they succeeded and where they failed。 He emphasizes their slow nature and their need for a very broad international commitment, just having the few dominant economic powers participate was not sufficient。 A great book for understanding how sanctions work, both politically and economically。 Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better understand this primary weapon in economic warfare。 。。。more

Ron

Not exactly a fun read and gets bogged down in an eulogy for the League of Nations。 However the insights make plodding thorough the book almost worth it。

Daniel

The Economic weapons are 2: sanction/blockade, and help。 This book covered the origin of economic sanction from the turn of the 20th century, until the Second World War。 1。 The great European powers decided who to sanction and help。 At first the Allies focused on raw material blockade, like Manganese for the protection of high quality steel against the Axis lowers。 However alternatives routes are possible and not all countries will participate, making it useless。 2。 It is imperialistic, when the The Economic weapons are 2: sanction/blockade, and help。 This book covered the origin of economic sanction from the turn of the 20th century, until the Second World War。 1。 The great European powers decided who to sanction and help。 At first the Allies focused on raw material blockade, like Manganese for the protection of high quality steel against the Axis lowers。 However alternatives routes are possible and not all countries will participate, making it useless。 2。 It is imperialistic, when the Allies had no qualms sanctioning China, they hesitated to do the same with Italy during the Ethiopian war。 They also had no inhibition to threaten Yugoslavia and Greece and were successful。 3。 Sanction is easy to implement but caused great suffering to the common people, but was seldom able to cause a regime to collapse。 4。 Against other Great powers it is useless and may backfire。 Germany decided to make itself self sufficient by attacking other countries。 Japan was provoked to attack the Pearl Harbour when America instituted an oil embargo。 5。 America was neutral before WW2 but became the most prolific user of sanctions after the war。 6。 Economic help to China and Russia against the Axis powers during WW2 definitely helped win the war。 It’s a strange book because it stops right after WW2, with only a passing mention of the whole period after。 I expected more。 。。。more

MR P

An interesting book to read on the train。 I recommend it if you are writing an essay about the subject。

Marcelo Jardim B

InsightfulProviding the history and legal foundation of economic blockade , especially in the interwar period , helps to understand the current fabric of international sanctions and if in the future the economic weapon will be able to avoid a major conflict between superpowers 。

Stephen Harrison

This book looks at the early development of using "the economic weapon", meaning sanctions, as a coercive tool rather than going to war。 Prior to WWI, economic sanctions were, in themselves, an act of war。 They were part of a country's attempt to subdue a rival/enemy, coupled with action on the battlefield。 Mulder looks at how they became an acceptable, an favored alternative, while still maintaining the facade of peace。The first part of the book looks at WWI and how economic sanctions were used This book looks at the early development of using "the economic weapon", meaning sanctions, as a coercive tool rather than going to war。 Prior to WWI, economic sanctions were, in themselves, an act of war。 They were part of a country's attempt to subdue a rival/enemy, coupled with action on the battlefield。 Mulder looks at how they became an acceptable, an favored alternative, while still maintaining the facade of peace。The first part of the book looks at WWI and how economic sanctions were used by the allies。 Germany used a submarine blockade to try to starve Britain and France, but there was no way Germany could be blockaded physically。 The alternative was to make it illegal to do business with Germany, which the British government did。 It took a huge bureaucracy to manage it and it ended up having only limited effect。 Nevertheless, the British government bragged at how effective sanctions were (helped by German propaganda that blamed the British for shortages) so sanctions seemed an easier way to stop belligerent action。 One drawback was that sanctions hurt the population as a whole rather than the military, so it seemed immoral。 It was also illegal because sanctions were, as said earlier, an act of war。 In the interwar period, these two worries were overcome。 The moral argument lost out because sanctions were relatively painless for those applying them, never risking the lives of its young men。 The legal argument lost out by some fancy sophistry that basically redefined war in international law。 As a result, sanctions because the preferred weapon of the big powers in the interwar period, especially through the League of Nations。 The biggest hitch with this was the United States。 It was not a member of the League and generally advocated neutrality and free trade, so it wasn't likely to participate in international sanctions。 Because it was such a large economy, it could bust sanctions on its own。 For that reason, the UK resisted any mechanism for automatic sanctions because enforcing them could put the league into a war with the United States。Another problem was that people feared sanctions might work too well。 When Japan invaded Manchuria, the United States resisted sanctions because it was feared it would force Japan into a war to gain territory to become self-sufficient, which it basically did。 Sanctions worked well enough against Yugoslavia in 1931 but completely failed to stop Italy in 1936。 Mussolini thought that by the time sanctions had an effect, he could have achieve "autarky", which means self-sufficiency。 He failed at that, but sanctions did not undermine Italy's war effort nearly as much as Mussolini's leadership did。 The author notes that one of the reasons that Spain stayed neutral in WWII was the threat of sanctions and knowing that neither Germany nor Italy could help out financially。 So sanctions were effective mainly if a country was in a weak position and was willing to limit national ambition。By the time WWII started up, the United States was using the "economic weapon" in a more "positive" way。 Through the Lend-Lease Program, the United States was able to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" and provided equipment and money to countries fighting the Axis。 In a preview of the "with us or against us" in the Cold War, the Soviet Union was placed under sanctions in 1939, following the Molotov-Rippentropf Pact and the Winter War, only to receive aid when it was attacked by Germany。 Similarly Finland was considered one of the good guys in the Winter War, although no American aid was forthcoming, but were put under sanctions when the allied with the Nazis to regain conquered territory。The big takeaways from the book are: 1) economic sanctions used to be an act of war but has since become a means to avoid war。 2) Sanctions have inconsistent success。 3) The success of sanctions depends on a lot of factors, some of which seem irrational。 4) The United States has gone from thinking sanctions were "un-American" to being their primary proponent。 5) The more sanctions are used, the less effective they are。 It is estimated that 1/3 of the people on the planet are under some form of economic sanction right now, but those sanctions are doing little to change behavior。This was a shockingly timely book, with the United States pulling out new and terrifying forms of the "economic weapon" to counter Russian aggression。 It has sanctioned Russia, which has had little effect on Russia's behavior, and it has provided aid to Ukraine, which has helped Ukraine resist the Russian advances。 It gets a little too detailed for me at times, but was still an easy ready and was very interesting。 。。。more

Matthew Emery

I knew I was going to love this book as soon as I saw the passage detailing the importance of manganese。 Mulder does an admirable job charting the evolution of sanctions。 What started an extension of blockade became a tool of enforcement for the League of Nations and then a weapon wielded against the axis in war。 Contrary to popular conception, League of Nations sanctions did see some success, but only for marginal powers。 It should be noted however that this book only covers the first and secon I knew I was going to love this book as soon as I saw the passage detailing the importance of manganese。 Mulder does an admirable job charting the evolution of sanctions。 What started an extension of blockade became a tool of enforcement for the League of Nations and then a weapon wielded against the axis in war。 Contrary to popular conception, League of Nations sanctions did see some success, but only for marginal powers。 It should be noted however that this book only covers the first and second world wars。 I hope Mulder writes a second volume on more modern innovations in sanctions。 。。。more

Nikhil

I had been anticipating this book for some time when I first heard of it, and I'm happy to say it lived up to my expectations。 Mulder's work here provides an examination of the relatively recent emergence of economic sanctions as a peacetime policy tool。 He traces the legal developments from the late 19th century onwards, relevant characters within governments and global institutions, the changing sides of policy debates, and the influence the threat of sanctions had over state policy。 Mulder th I had been anticipating this book for some time when I first heard of it, and I'm happy to say it lived up to my expectations。 Mulder's work here provides an examination of the relatively recent emergence of economic sanctions as a peacetime policy tool。 He traces the legal developments from the late 19th century onwards, relevant characters within governments and global institutions, the changing sides of policy debates, and the influence the threat of sanctions had over state policy。 Mulder thoughtfully integrates the role of conflict in Asia and the materials of the Americas in this account largely devoted to a diplomatic system with European states at its core。 I believe it is a worthwhile read for those with an interest in interwar history, diplomacy, law, and economics。While this book devotes limited space to more contemporary applications of sanctions, many of Mulder's lessons remain relevant。 In particular, deploying a tool predicated upon a rational response when the other agent may not have "rational" motivations remains a real challenge。 Furthermore, the different levels of effectiveness that sanctions carry for states of different sizes or economic footing remain as salient as ever。 Given the recent prominence of this topic, maybe Mulder's work will frame some current consideration about sanctions in a helpful way。 。。。more

Tim Phillips

This is one of the most interesting history books I have ever read。 To me it seems that it would be somewhat tedious but it’s anything but that。 It opens my eyes to various things that are often not talked about with the common folks。

Josh

Mulder's book explains how the WWI blockade of the Central Powers led the League of Nations to adopt economic sanctions as one of their primary tools for preventing aggression。 From there, Mulder examines how negative sanctions, both in terms of denying financing and of physical blockade (as well as boycotting a country's exports to deny it foreign exchange reserves) were used successfully against small states in the 1920s, but failed to bring down Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-6。 This us Mulder's book explains how the WWI blockade of the Central Powers led the League of Nations to adopt economic sanctions as one of their primary tools for preventing aggression。 From there, Mulder examines how negative sanctions, both in terms of denying financing and of physical blockade (as well as boycotting a country's exports to deny it foreign exchange reserves) were used successfully against small states in the 1920s, but failed to bring down Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-6。 This use of the negative sanction is paired with an examination of how the League pursued but failed to enact a positive economic weapon to help victims of aggression with credit to buy weapons and keep their state economically afloat through a war。 Mulder also traces the pursuit of autarky by the rising Axis powers, how this was driven by fear of sanctions in a coming war, and how this ultimately accelerated WW2's outbreak。 He then explains how the United Nations were able to successfully harness a positive economic weapons in the Lend-Lease Act to support the Soviet and Chinese armies in the field for the bulk of the war。 The most interesting part is probably the conclusion, where Mulder examines the impact of sanctions, how the US used them throughout and since the Cold War, and ultimately presents studies that suggest sanctions nearly never work in deterring a target state from pursuing aggression or a policy, a finding he agrees with。 There is a lot of interesting history here, although Mulder does assume his readers will have a greater familiarity with interwar Europe than I do, which was occasionally frustrating。 I wish the rise of sanctions under the UN had been explored in greater depth than a few pages in the conclusion - it might be more accurate to say that Mulder traces the creation of sanctions and their refinement than their rise to being the West's near-default response to bad actors。 。。。more

Ivo Fernandes

It's a very good book that analyses a lot of sanctions and embargoes over history。The conclusion of the author is sanctions are not very effective on avoiding war, so it's a bit a book that reacts to the narrative that politicians use to justify the sanctions, and the book doesn't investigate a lot about the possibility that sanctions come directly from the military command, and have objectives beyond stopping the war, because in the objective in war is to win, maybe more to win and to be the st It's a very good book that analyses a lot of sanctions and embargoes over history。The conclusion of the author is sanctions are not very effective on avoiding war, so it's a bit a book that reacts to the narrative that politicians use to justify the sanctions, and the book doesn't investigate a lot about the possibility that sanctions come directly from the military command, and have objectives beyond stopping the war, because in the objective in war is to win, maybe more to win and to be the strongest than to stop it。 The book starts by comparing weapons that target civilians: bombardments, sanctions, and chemical weapon, and how curious it is that chemical weapons being the less effective to mass murder is the one that is considered a crime of war, by the other way first world war has half a million death toll attributed to the germany embargo done by the british fleet。 Take this number with a bit of salt as both britain was quite interested in exaggerate the impact of their smartness, and germany as a military power was also super interested in putting death toll the most far away from the frontline possible。But the book is very descriptive about the whole process, the sanctions rise in first tentatives of creating an international community, also it created a complete different understanding of war itself, first sanctions were created in a way that war was only considered war if the country declared war to war, but as Mussolini invaded Ethiopia without a formal declaration of war the international community needed to pick a better way of defining war。 And also "effective in war" is another term quite difficult to define as we never know what are the true objectives of any war。It also defines what is need for war, to win a war the winner needs to have force, to have resources and the will to win。 If having force could be seen as pure steel, resources as oil or some kind of energy, and the will to win being the tendency of the people to enter a war。 This separation makes very clear why the economic weapon is so used, is not effective but make the politician look like he cares, and also the people will be much less shocked by using a technology like embargo because is very indirect and as people are too dumb to really understand what they are doing, they will sleep much better than if they see the results of leaving a chemical weapon, even if they create a much worse death toll, the images will not be as shocking。One example of success of sanctions in war was that neither Spain or Portugal entered the second world war besides being clearly more aligned with Hitler than with Churchill, but neither of these countries were ready to lose access to american oil。So probably sanctions are much more effective in dealing with a country that would enter a war with light spirit without a real plan for a long term objective, than dealing with an Nazi Germany, or an Imperial Japan that were much more inclined to get by force what they believed to deserve, and cloud not get by commercial means with or without the economic weapon being a factor。The high point of the book was when it starts to link the embargoes to the creativity that they create, like Germany discovering liquid coal for lack of access to external oil in the 1930's。 。。。more

Brock Bank

Very interesting read about the creation and formalization of intl sanction regimes focused mostly on the world wars and Interregnum。Most interest wrt thinking at the time about pros/cons and justifications/goals

Mehul Dhikonia

The use of trade blockades as an economic weapon during the Great War paved way for the use of sanctions as a tool to thwart future aggression across international boundaries。 Mulder, in his book, explores this evolution of sanctions and how it shaped the world order in the interwar period, leading up to World War 2, and how things looked briefly after。 The same aspect of economic sanctions that makes them philosophically appealing to liberal internationalism。。。homo economicus rationale - als The use of trade blockades as an economic weapon during the Great War paved way for the use of sanctions as a tool to thwart future aggression across international boundaries。 Mulder, in his book, explores this evolution of sanctions and how it shaped the world order in the interwar period, leading up to World War 2, and how things looked briefly after。 The same aspect of economic sanctions that makes them philosophically appealing to liberal internationalism。。。homo economicus rationale - also limits their salience。 。。。more

Justin Hauter

Though initially instituted (in modern times) as a means to temper agression leading up to WWI, economic sanctions have increasingly gained import as an assumed lever of conflict de-escalation through inclusion in The League of Nations and now the UNWhile sanctions have seen success in curbing smaller conflicts and had effect on countries less integral to the the international supply chain, they are usually able to be side stepped via a third party (ally of the country under sanctions or neutral Though initially instituted (in modern times) as a means to temper agression leading up to WWI, economic sanctions have increasingly gained import as an assumed lever of conflict de-escalation through inclusion in The League of Nations and now the UNWhile sanctions have seen success in curbing smaller conflicts and had effect on countries less integral to the the international supply chain, they are usually able to be side stepped via a third party (ally of the country under sanctions or neutral party) unless there is a uniform committment to implemenation。The threat of economic sanctions has typically resulted in a turn towards autarky (economic self-sufficiency) on the part of the country being sanctionedThe current view on economic sanctions, from what I understood, was a mix of economic aid to victims and targeted sanctions against the agressor。 Initiatives such as the lend-lease program (FDR, WWII) have seen success。Probably a lot more that I didn't understand。。 。。。more

Lee

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Tim Martin

I had bought this book (I listened to the audiobook) wanting an overall history of sanctions and a survey of their modern usage。 Though these topics are briefly covered in the conclusion of the book (and what I read was interesting, such as the fact that at any given time about a third of the world’s population lives under some sort of sanctions and that as sanctions have been more widespread, even commonplace, their efficacy has actually gone down, with at best something like 30 to 40% of the t I had bought this book (I listened to the audiobook) wanting an overall history of sanctions and a survey of their modern usage。 Though these topics are briefly covered in the conclusion of the book (and what I read was interesting, such as the fact that at any given time about a third of the world’s population lives under some sort of sanctions and that as sanctions have been more widespread, even commonplace, their efficacy has actually gone down, with at best something like 30 to 40% of the time producing the desired outcome), this book is a not an overview of sanctions in the 20th and 21st centuries。 What this book is is an account of the origins of sanctions as tool in the military and diplomatic arsenal in international politics, something different from a blockade (which requires active military interdiction, is basically a type of siege, and is considered an act of war) and a boycott (which is often private in nature, based on individual decisions, and does little if anything to stop others from trading with someone being boycotted)。 Author Nicholas Mulder traces the origins of sanctions in World War I and most especially in the interwar years of the 1920s and the 1930s, relating the origins of sanctions, debates over their morality, their efficacy, how they should be implemented, the mechanisms of their implementation, and gives accounts of successful sanctions (such as say in Greece and Yugoslavia in the 1920s) and unsuccessful sanctions (against Italy in the 1930s when it invaded Ethiopia) and even when sanctions were counterproductive (such as being one of the factors in the Axis powers trying to conquer territory and claim resources, that these nations were trying to become sanction proof)。 Also covered are the positive type of sanction, economic assistance, such as Lend-Lease during World War II。 The majority of the book is on the interwar years and is often as much a history of the League of Nations and the particulars of various conflicts (often at least at first in the Balkans) in which sanctions came to be used as it about sanctions themselves though the sections on World War II were quite interesting。 At times the particulars of League politics, Great Power geopolitics, the facts of 1920s and 1930s economics, and the various conflicts in Ethiopia and China and elsewhere dominated the narrative, but the author again and again touched upon larger issues, such as debates over types of sanctions and their morality (should sanctions extend to cover food for civilians and if allowing exemptions for civilian food meant anything if governments just gave whatever food came through to the military and the elite)。 It was interesting given the devasting role blockades and sanctions had on Europe in World War I (I believe the book mentioned a few times early on 300,000 to 400,000 died in Central Europe as result from sanctions) how grim their use was viewed, something akin to the views states would later have on the use of nuclear weapons。 I found the contrast between sanctions in the interwar years and today interesting。 During the 1920s and the 1930s the United States was again and again opposed to sanctions yet after World War II and especially at the end of the 20th century and into the 21st, the United States is the leader in sanctions origins and implementation。 During the League years sanctions were strictly used to keep one state from invading another state (or remaining once invaded) and that was it, while after World War II sanctions were almost always used for intrastate conflicts and disagreements, such as trying to punish Cuban revolutionaries, Iranian revolutionaries, and end Apartheid in South Africa。 It was interesting that the mere threat of sanctions sometimes had great effects in the interwar years, yet in the years following World War II this was not really a thing。 Lots of interesting topics covered, from why sanctions weren’t really a thing in the 19th century (basically states were generally too self-reliant to really be hurt by them), how the effects of sanctions in World War I might have been exaggerated by especially those targeted (with Germany especially keen to play up the damage done by blockades and sanctions far out of proportion to the actual damage done), that one in talking about sanctions has to separate efficacy from effects (such as say analyzing the effects of sanctions on Italy when it invaded Ethiopia in the 1930s, that while Ethiopia was not saved, Italy was very much damaged by sanctions), how sanctions came to be separate from acts of war and indeed as being seen as perfectly legitimate tools used by the international community without actually going to war, and in the conclusion, how the Cold War and the nuclear deterrent made the use of sanctions especially attractive。 A bit specialized perhaps, a few sections were rather dry, but it was an interesting book。 I would have liked the conclusion section discussing sanctions after World War II to be have been a lot longer, and sometimes the level of detail on League of Nation politics was more than I had bargain for。 For those interested in World War II the book does offer interesting information, particularly on the role of sanctions against the Japanese and how sanctions affected Fascist Italy and Spain。 。。。more

Graeme Newell

I remember reading back a few years ago that the very nature of warfare has been reinvented。 An author I follow commented that no two countries with the McDonald's would ever go to war with each other because of the catastrophic economic consequences that would ensue。The Russian invasion of the Ukraine disproved this theory, but it has proved an amazing case study in the effectiveness of economic warfare。This book lays out the history of economic warfare and provides a detailed breakout of the t I remember reading back a few years ago that the very nature of warfare has been reinvented。 An author I follow commented that no two countries with the McDonald's would ever go to war with each other because of the catastrophic economic consequences that would ensue。The Russian invasion of the Ukraine disproved this theory, but it has proved an amazing case study in the effectiveness of economic warfare。This book lays out the history of economic warfare and provides a detailed breakout of the times it was effective and ineffective。 It lays out a solid case for the specific rules that must be followed and criteria that must be met in order for an economic blockade to have an impact。 。。。more